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I.

INTRODUCTION

A small cargo ship wholly owned by a corporate giant sinks at sea.
The ship, its cargo, and her crew are lost. Mothers and fathers, sons and
daughters, friends and loved ones are gone forever. Estimated claims
against the owners of the cargo ship well exceed seven figures. The
corporate shipowners, although heavily insured and fully capable of
financially absorbing the cost of settling all claims, seek to limit their
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liability to the value of their small cargo ship and its freight under the 1851
Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act [hereinafter the Act].' If the U.S.
District Court allows the limitation, which is very probable, the claimants
will be forced to divide a final settlement that is but a token scrap of what
is equitable and just. The corporate owner is essentially absolved of
liability while lost lives go uncompensated.
Sadly, shocking tales of gross inequities such as these are all too
common in the realm of admiralty law and have been so for over a century
and a half. The Act has magnificently weathered the sands of time and has
remained hidden in the depths of American admiralty law to the detriment
of many a victim.' Commentators, judges, and legislators alike have cast
aspersions on the Act since its inception and finding proponents of the Act,
aside from insurers and the shipowners themselves, is very difficult.3
Congress, however, has consistently ignored the harsh criticisms and the
multitude of suggestions by the courts to repeal the law and have sat idly
by while the legitimate reasons for maintaining the Act have long ceased to
exist. 4 Suffice it to say, this legislative inertia calls for a different approach
to the problem of unfair settlement practices due to the Act at the expense
of innocent claimants. 5 Therefore, the duty of striking down the Act now
rests squarely on the shoulders of our courts. However, it is important to
first become acquainted with the Act and delve into its antiquated history to
identify the clear need for its repeal.
Enacted by Congress in 1851 to protect the fledgling American
shipping industry and promote competition on an international level, the
Act has become known in modern times as an "anachronism, a principle

I. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (2003).
2.
See, e.g., In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89, 1972 A.M.C. 1122 (2d Cir.
1972); Spencer Kellog & Sons v. Hicks (The Linseed King), 285 U.S. 502, 1932 A.M.C.
503 (1932).
3.

G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 820, 822 (2d ed.

1975). Professors Gilmore and Black write: "During the [past] twenty years the limitation
principle has been attacked by many and defended by almost none ... the argument that the
Limitation of Liability Act has served its time and should be repealed has become a
commonplace." Id. See also Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1954)
(stating that there are no longer any justifiable reasons for the Act); In re Petition of The
Dodge, Inc., 282 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1960) (asserting that the Act should be resolved in
favor of claimants).
4.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1954) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Olympic Towing Co. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
The case was an attempt to decipher the enigma of the 4-1-4 decision in Maryland Casualty.
5.
Delta Country Ventures, Inc. v. Magana, 986 F.2d 1260, 1267 (1993) (stating
that the court would like to see Congress "decommission" the Act).
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which should be relegated to the era of wooden hulls."6 For over 150 years
the Act has, in essence, given shipowners the right to limit their maximum
liability for collisions and other losses which take place without the
owner's privity or knowledge to the value of their vessel and its freight
then pending.7 The Act also provides for exclusive federal admiralty
jurisdiction to determine whether an owner is entitled to limitation of
liability.8 Consequently, damages in excess of these values are withheld
from those who have been the most severely harmed as a result of these
maritime accidents. 9 These egregious inequities lead one to wonder why,
in modem America, with insurance and corporate ownership so pervasive
in marine transportation, shipowners should still be subsidized at the
expense of these innocent claimants. Although the Act was necessary and
appropriate legislation in nineteenth century America, it has served its
purpose and should now be scuttled as modem America no longer needs
the protections afforded by the Act.' 0
This comment begins with an in-depth discussion of the origins and
history of shipowner liability, developments in American law prior to
passage of the Act, the policy considerations underlying the passage of the
Act in 1851, and early uses of the Act. Next, the only two legislative
amendments to the Act (enacted in 1884 and 1934) are discussed to provide
insight into the development of the law. This will culminate into an
analysis of the current state of the Act and its applicability to modern
maritime cases, as well as delve into modern trends in the law. Next,
reasons why the courts may intervene and strike down the law will be
examined. This discussion focuses on the changing policy considerations
from 1851 to the present, the courts' inherent duty to strike down laws no
longer resting on valid considerations, and asserts that the Act is in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. In particular, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause

6.
Carter T. Gunn, Limitation of Liability: United States and Convention
Jurisdictions,8 MAR. 29, 29 (1983).
7.
Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 3, § 43, 9 Stat. 635, (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.
app. §§ 181-189 (2003)).
8. Id.
9.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 820. Their work states that the liability of
a vessel owner could theoretically be zero even after a catastrophic accident. However, after
the 1934 amendment to the Act, a vessel owners' liability will likely be the value of the craft
prior to the voyage, thus retaining some measure of compensation.
10.
Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch v. United States, 557 F.2d 438, 454 (5th Cir. 1977)
(questioning whether the Act retains any vitality within the sphere in which it has
traditionally been applied as times have drastically changed since Congress initially passed
the Act).
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arguments embody scholarly and case law support. Additionally there are
comparisons to analogous liability limitation doctrines that have fallen to
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. Finally, this Comment
concludes that due to congressional inertia and the severe erosion of the
Act's original policy considerations and underpinnings, the courts should
assume the burden of striking down this antiquated law on the grounds of
Equal Protection and Due Process.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

ORIGINS OF SHIPOWNER LIMITS ON LIABILITY

The objective of limiting shipowner liability has always been to
encourage investment in maritime ventures by limiting the possibility of a
single-ship disaster destroying the personal fortune of a shipowner." In the
days of fledgling merchant marines, financiers required assurances that
their personal liability would be limited to no more than their initial
investment in the venture.' 2 This liability limitation became a common
feature embedded in the maritime law of many 13nations, and while having a
very long history, its origins are not quite clear.
Some commentators have speculated that limitations of shipowner
liability formed a part of Roman law while others have reported that the
doctrine was codified as a part of the Amalphitan Tables during the
eleventh century.' 4 Regardless of its origins, as increased commerce made
its way throughout Europe, so did the concept of limited liability.' 5 By the
time of the Middle Ages, most shipping nations of the Mediterranean had
developed some form of the limitation.' 6 It has also been noted that the
century helped
beginning of the Commercial Revolution in the sixteenth
7
spread the doctrine throughout the nations of Europe.'

2001).

II.

THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 808 (3d ed.

12.
Gunn, supra note 6, at 30.
13.
The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 126 (1894).
14.
James J. Donovan, The Origins and Development of Limitation of Shipowners'
Liability, 53 TUL. L. REV. 999, 1000-01 (1979) (quoting Holmes' discussion of the doctrine
of noxae deditio-"the ship [is] not only the source, but the limit of liability"); Dennis J.
Stone, The Limitation of Liability Act: Time to Abandon Ship?, 32 J. MAR. L. & COM. 317,
318-19 (2001). Stone reports that other scholars believe the doctrine was a part of the citystate known as Amalphitan during its "commercial zenith." Id.
Donovan, supra note 14, at 1000-03.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
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Among the nations using the shipowner liability limitation were the
Hansa, German, and Baltic port states who became allied in safeguarding
their ship-borne commerce.' 8 "The Hanseatic Ordinances of 1614 and
1644 limited the liability of a shipowner to the value of his vessel, ...
[while] the proceeds of the sale of the vessel were to be the extent of the
satisfaction of all claims."' 9 In France, Louis XIV codified the French
Marine Ordinance of 1681, upon which many other maritime codes were
20
founded, and which also provided for limitation of shipowners' liability.
This ordinance provided that "the owners of the ship shall be answerable
for the deeds'z of the master; but shall be discharged, abandoning their ship
and freight."'
These early codes were quickly absorbed into the maritime law of
nations whose jurisprudence rested on civil law, but were much more
slowly incorporated into the common law nations such as England.22 The
English common law principles of liability and respondeat superior held
the shipowner responsible for the acts of the ship's master, which proved to
be very burdensome to the English shipping industry while trying to
compete in an increasingly competitive international shipping market. 23 It
was not until 1734, after the economic disparity between Continental
Europe and English shipowners widened, that the English Parliament
enacted a statute pertaining to limitation of shipowners' liability.24 The
catalyst prompting this English legislation was the case of Boucher v.
Lawson.25 Here the unlimited liability of British shipowners became
exposed when the English court held the shipowners liable for an entire
cargo of bullion that was stolen by the ship's master.2 6
The English limitation act, passed in response to Boucher, provided
that shipowners were not liable in excess of the value of the ship and its

18.
Id. at 1003.
19.
Id. (limiting shipowners' liability can be seen as codified in the Statutes of
Hamburg (1603)). "The owners shall not be answerable for any act of the master done
without their order, any further than their part of the ship amounts to." Id.
20.
2 PETERS, ADMIRALTY DECISIONS IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES FOR THE PENNSYLVANIA DISTRICT (1807), reprinted in 30 F. Cas. 1203, 1203-16

(1880).
21.
21d.
22.
3 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 4, at 1-32 (7th ed. 1982).
23.
See The Rebecca, 20 F. Cas. 373, 380 (D. Me. 1831) (No. 11,619).
24.
Donovan, supra note 14, at 1007. See also An Act to Settle How FarOwners of
Ships Shall be Answerable for the Acts of the Masters or Mariners, 7 GEO. L.J. 2, ch. 15
(1734) [hereinafter An Act to Settle].
25.

95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734); LORD CHARLES TENTERDEN, A TREATISE OF THE
(190 1).

LAW RELATIVE TO LAW OF MERCHANT SHIPS AND SEAMAN, 163

26.

Id
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freight due or coming due for the voyage, or for any damage the ship's
master or mariners caused without the privily or knowledge of the
shipowner.27 This version, unlike its European predecessors, calculated the
shipowner's liability on the value of the vessel immediately before the
accident, not after. 28 Additionally, this act differed from the German and
French models by expressly conditioning limitation on the owner's lack of
privity and knowledge. 29 The 1734 act went quite far in updating English
maritime jurisprudence and energized the British shipping economy, but it
was still quite restrictive in its scope. 30 To remedy this, the English
Parliament amended the act in 1786 and again in 1813 to extend the
limitation of liability to those who may be liable other than master and
crew, as well as to losses caused by fire. 31 This extension was known as
the passage of "An Act to Limit the Responsibility of Ship Owners, in
and was the predecessor of the American Limitation of
Certain Cases"
32
Liability Act.
B.

DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICA PRIOR TO PASSAGE OF THE

1851

ACT

American shipowners and maritime capitalists were quick to
appreciate the absence of a limitation of liability doctrine in American
jurisprudence.3 3 It was at this point in American history that Senator
Hannibal Hamlin of Maine led the way for change in what appeared to be a
gap in American law.3 4 As Chairman of the Commerce Committee,
Hamlin fought to level the playing field between the American shipowners,
shipping investors, and the British by pushing for limitation doctrines in
America.35 As a consequence of Hamlin's efforts, the first limitation
doctrine was adopted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1819.36
This statute would have also benefited Maine shipowners until 1820, when
Maine separated from Massachusetts.3 7 After statehood, however, Maine

The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 128 (1894).
See generally An Act to Settle, supra note 24.
Walter W. Eyer, Shipowner's Limitation of Liability-New Directionsfor an
Old Doctrine, 16 STAN. L. REV. 370, 371 (1964).
30.
Stone, supra note 14, at 321.
27.
28.
29.

31.
32.
33.

Id. at 321-22.
Id.

Donovan, supra note 14, at 1000-05.

Eyer, supra note 29, at 372.
34.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
1821 Me. Laws 78 §§ 8-10, revised in 1840, 1857 and 1930 (respecting the
37.
willful destruction and casting away of ships and cargoes; the custody of shipwrecked
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shipowners quickly persuaded the new Maine legislature to follow the lead
of Massachusetts and adopt a similar limitation doctrine.38 These two
states, known for their powerful shipping constituencies and tremendous
involvement in ship-building, ship-owning and ship-operating ventures,
modeled their statutes after the 1734 English Statute. 39 The reason for this
was identical to the reason that had persuaded three British parliaments to
do the same-to encourage investment in the ocean-going maritime
industry in which these states now specialized. 40
A call for a national limitation law in the United States arose soon
thereafter during an era in which lake and river traffic were dramatically
increasing due in part to the advent of the steamboat and the opening of the
Erie Canal in 1825. 4 1 Further attention was drawn toward the need for a
national limitation law in the wake of the landmark case, New Jersey Steam
Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank of Boston (The Lexington).42
When the steamboat Lexington departed from New York a number of
cotton bales stowed next to the ship's steam chimney caught fire, which
eventually consumed the boat.4 3 The ship sank in Long Island Sound,
taking the lives of all but four of the one hundred fifty passengers, and also
caused the loss of the plaintiff's chest of gold and silver coins worth over
$18,000. 44 The shipowner denied any negligence, asserting that his
servants exercised ordinary care, and that, in any event, he was not liable
because of the notices of non-liability contained in the bill of lading
exculpatory clause and the posted signs on the wharf.45 Furthermore, the
shipowner argued that his common law in personam liability was limited
by special agreement between the parties.46 The bill of lading excepted
"danger of fire, water ... and all other accidents" and limited carrier
goods, and trade and navigation).

38.
39.

Id.
Id.

40.
Putnam, The Limited Liability of Ship-Owners for Master's Faults, 17 AM. L.
REV. 1, 11 (1883).
41.
See generally RONALD E. SHAW, CANALS FOR A NATION: THE CANAL ERA IN THE
UNITED STATES 1790-1860 (1991); JOHN H. MORRISON, HISTORY OF AMERICAN STEAM

NAVIGATION (1903). Both advents greatly shortened the route for movement of midwestern produce to eastern markets.
42.
47 U.S. (6 How.) 344 (1848) [hereinafter The Lexington].
43.
Id. at 384.
44.
Id. at 345.
45.
Id. at 346, 350. The bill of lading provided, after spaces for the names of the
shipper, consignee, and vessel, the exculpatory language contained above, and at the wharf,
a sign with the following warning was posted: "Notice to shippers and Consignees: All
goods, freight, baggage, bank-bills, specie, or any other kind of property, taken, shipped, or
put on board the steamers... must be at the risk of the owners of such goods." Id.
46.
Id. at 345.
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liability to $200 per package.47 The Supreme Court disagreed and held:
"[W]e think there was great want of care .... which amounted to gross
negligence, on the part of the [shipowner]. We are of opinion, therefore,
that the [shipowner is] liable for the loss of the specie (coins),
notwithstanding the special agreement under which it was shipped. ''4 The
Lexington decision prompted shipowner outcries as it was now possible
that carriers could be held liable for their negligent damage to cargo,
despite exculpatory language in the contracts of carriage.4 9
Another shipping accident, not long after the decision in The
Lexington, added to the anxiety in the shipping industry in a case called
The Henry Clay.50 The Henry Clay burned at a wharf in New York on
September 4, 1849, after loading, but before getting underway. 5 ' Cargo
owners sued the shipowner for their losses and although there was no proof
of actual fault or negligence, the shipowner was held liable.5 2 These cases,
along with the recognition by shipowners of their unlimited liability, soon
prompted Congress to legislate for the protection of the American maritime
industry.5 3
C.
INITIAL PASSAGE OF THE ACT IN
CONSIDERATIONS

1851 AND THE UNDERLYING POLICY

The Act was passed in 1851 for the express purpose of aiding a
fledgling American merchant marine by attempting to put it on par with its
British competition, whose shipping had been protected by limitation laws
for over a century.54 This protection was in great demand in America at the
time, as shipping was an extremely high-risk profession.5 5 An investor
supporting a shipping venture had no control over the conduct of the ship
once underway, and given the primitive vessels of the time, the hazards of
the sea, and the common law liabilities of the shipowner as principal, the

Id. at 346-47.
47.
48.
The Lexington, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 385.
Eyer, supra note 29, at 372.
49.
The decision is not officially reported but is recounted in Wright v. Norwich &
50.
N.Y. Transp. Co., 30 F. Cas. 685, 687 (C.C.D. Conn. 1870) (No. 18,087), aff'd, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 104 (1872) [hereinafter The City of Norwich].
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
53.
Eyer, supra note 29, at 372.
54.
Harolds, Limitation of Liability and Its Application to Pleasure Boats, 37 TEMP.
L.Q. 423, 426 (1964).
55.
Id.
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shipping industry became a very unattractive investment. 6 Greater liability
resulted in much greater cost and left the American shipowner without
protection, putting him at a substantial competitive disadvantage in the
world shipping market. 57
The Act passed without debate in the House of Representatives and
less than a full day's debate in the Senate on Tuesday, January 28, 1851 by
a vote of twenty-eight to twenty-one.5 8 Again the major proponent of the
liability bill, Senator Hannibal Hamlin, thwarted attempts by Senator
George Badger to delay passage of the Act because of the major changes it
would introduce into the American shipping industry. 59 Hamlin stressed
the importance of the Act and eased skepticism by analogizing the
proposed statute to the existing English statutes:
This bill is predicated on what is now the English law, and
it is deemed advisable by the Committee on Commerce
that the American marine should stand at home and abroad
as well as the English marine. Senators who may be
disposed to look into the provisions of the English law will
find ...the very principle contained in this bill. When the
bill shall come up for discussion, I shall be ready to offer
such suggestions as a force themselves upon my mind, to
show the necessity and propriety of this measure. 60
Hamlin further noted that the Committee on Commerce had consulted
intelligent merchants and commercial men who were more aware of the
needs of commerce than the judiciary, and again noted the similarity to the
successful English law. 61 Senator Butler concurred; at which point all other
opposition motions were withdrawn. 62 It should be noted, however, that
the next day a number of opponents went on record stating that the Act was
of poor draftsmanship and was hastily drawn.63 One Senator was noted as
saying, "it is a little unreasonable to expect that the bill shall be taken up,
considered, and passed at this period. [The bill] needs very considerable

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Complaint of Tracey, 608 F. Supp. 263 (D. Mass. 1985).
Id. at 266.
Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 334-35 (1851).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
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'64 Another went on
modification[s] ... and there are great doubts about it.
to say, "it is an alteration that ought not to be made without full and grave
consideration and the most ample opportunity for discussion. ,,65 Inlight of
these statements, it is clear then that the "poor draftsmanship" of this law,
complained of in our modern courts, was a concern over which impatience
won out. Consequently, in the noble interest of saving the fledgling
American shipping industry from financial ruin and helping it compete on
an international level, Congress chose to adopt a poorly drafted statute that
would plague maritime law for the next century and a half.
This new law was derived from a number of sources.66 The
framework was adopted from the English statute, while other parts were
borrowed from the Maine and Massachusetts statutes. 67 The remainder was
a product of imaginative American draftsmanship.68 The new Act provided
in its most pertinent provisions:

(1) A shipowner is not to be liable for fire not caused by
the owner's design or neglect.69
(2) A shipowner is exonerated from liability for certain
valuable cargoes, such as specie, which are shipped
without declaration of what they are.7 °
(3) In any case, except for crew wages, a shipowner's
liability is not to exceed the value of his interest in the
vessel, plus pending freight, unless a loss is occasioned
with his privity or knowledge.7 '

64.
65.

66.

Cong. Globe, 31 st Cong., 2d Sess. 334-35 (1851).
Id.

3 BENEDICT

ON ADMIRALTY

§ 4, 1-32 (7th ed. 1982).

67.
3 Id.
68.
3 Id.
69.
46 U.S.C. app. § 182 (2002) [hereinafter Fire Statute].
70.
46 U.S.C. app. § 181 (2002) The relation to The Lexington disaster is quite
clear, but this section is rarely used today.
71.
46 U.S.C. app. § 183 (2002). After 150 years, this provision continues to be the
heart of the U.S. law. Section 183(a) provides:
The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign,
for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of any
property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel,
or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or
thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without
the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not, except in
the cases provided for in subsection (b) of this section, exceed the
amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her
freight then pending.
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(4) Cargo and property claimants are required to share pro
rata if the limitation fund is insufficient to pay all claims.72
(5) The right of a shipowner to limit liability is to include
an owner pro hac vice or bareboat charterer, namely one
who "shall man, victual and navigate" the vessel.73
(6) Masters, officers, and seamen are still personally liable
for their own faults, even if they are also owners of the
ship.74

The key provision of the Act is Section 183, which restricts the in
personam liability of the shipowner to the value of the owner's interest in
the vessel and the freight then pending.75 Although the Act imputed
vicarious liability to the shipowner, employee malfeasance was limited
absent "privity or knowledge" of the vessel owner.7 6 The Act, however,
mysteriously provides that both shipowners and claimants "may take the
appropriate proceedings in any court, for the purpose of apportioning the
sum for which the owner of the ship or vessel may be liable amongst the
parties entitled thereto. 77 There is no indication in which precise court
(federal or state) this is to occur, nor is there any indication of the type of
jurisdiction (law, equity, or admiralty) from which procedures are to be
drawn. 78 Again, these problems have only served to impede the goals of
the Act and have furthered frustration toward this poorly drafted statute.
D.

EARLY USE OF THE LAW

Ironically, two decades passed before the Supreme Court heard its
first case under the Act. 79 Today, it is unclear why it took so long for the
normally litigious shipping industry to bring such a dispute to the High
Court. 80 However, some scholars point out that the interlude included the
Civil War and Reconstruction, while others blame the lack of readily

72.
73.
74.
75.

46 U.S.C. app. § 184
46 U.S.C. app. § 186
46 U.S.C. app. § 187
B. Matthew Struble,

76.
77.

46 U.S.C. app. § 183 (2002).
Id.

79.

Norwich & New York Transp. Co. v. Wright (The City of Norwich), 80 U.S.

(2002).
(2002).
(2002).
Of Saving to Suitors, Limitation of Shipowners' Liability,

and the Inherent Conflict Between, 67 Mo. L. REV. 963, 973 (2002).

78.

Id.

(13 Wall.) 104 (1872).
80.
Joseph C. Sweeney, Limitation of Shipowner Liability: Its American Roots and
Some Problems, 32 J.MAR. L. & CoM. 241. 283 (2001 ).
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ascertainable procedures for taking advantage of this substantial privilege
conferred by Congress to the shipowners. 8' In any event, the first case
calling for the interpretation of the Act by the Supreme Court came in 1871
in Norwich & New York Transportation Co. v. Wright (The City of
Norwich).82
The case began April 16, 1866, when the steamboat City of Norwich
and the schooner General S. Van Vliet collided off the coast of Long Island
Sound.83 Both vessels sank with a total loss of all cargo. 84 The ensuing
litigation over the next five years prompted the Supreme Court to issue two
separate rulings that justify referring to the Act as a form of fortune de mer,
or floating game of chance.85 In their first decision, the Court held that the
limitation fund was to be derived from the value of the vessel after, not
before, the collision.86 In their second decision, if the first decision were
already not bad enough for claimants, the Court held that the value of the
City of Norwich was to be taken at the end of her voyage.8 7 In other words,
the value of the ship was determined at the time she sank, which was
naught.88
These arguably unfair decisions came from a sharply divided Court
and were strangely in opposition to the English law and Massachusetts law
upon which the Act was originally founded,89 yet they remain good law
today. Consequently, a shipowner would now be relieved of any liability
by surrendering the ship, whatever its value. 90 As the Court recognized in
Norwich, that value would be nothing if the ship were a total loss. 9 1
Therefore, the inescapable consequence of these decisions is that the
greatest disaster produces the smallest fund for those who may have been
harmed.9 2
Perhaps one of the most notorious examples of the possible egregious
inequities due to these decisions arose in the Barracuda Tanker Corp. case

81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.

Norwich, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 106-07.

84.
Id.
85.
Donald C. Greenman, Maritime Casualties and the Limitation of Liability Act,
32 J.MAR. L. &CoM. 279, 283 (2001).
86.
Norwich, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 104. A sunken vessel was, therefore, worthless
and resulted in a valueless limitation fund.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
City of Norwich, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 127, n.18 (citing Walker v. Boston Ins.
Co., 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 288 (1859)).
90.
Norwich, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 126-27.
91.
Id.
92.
Greenman, supra note 85, at 283.
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in 1968. 93 Here, the Torrey Canyon was stranded off the southwest coast
of England while carrying 119,328 tons of crude oil. 94 The oil then leaked
from the tanker and heavily polluted both sides of the English Channel.
Finally, the Royal Air Force was called in to bomb and sink the ship.95
Barracuda Tanker, the corporate owner of the Torrey Canyon, immediately
filed for limitation of liability in federal district court.96 The court deemed
the ship a total loss and approved a stipulated value in the ship of fifty
dollars, the value of a single lifeboat salvaged from the wreck.97
It is quite clear that, from its inception, the consequences of the Act
can be extremely unfair and detrimental to those who have been injured in
a maritime accident. The victims of these accidents are often left with
great financial as well as physical loss and are stranded in a frustrating
position without any redress for their suffered harms.
III. AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT
A.

LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF

1884

The first amendment to the Act came as a result of the increased
importance of commerce on inland waterways to the development of the
American shipping industry. 98 It was the height of the Industrial
Revolution and attitudes of the time strongly favored private investments
and commercial development.9 9 A stalwart shipping industry was therefore
a necessary component for a successful national economy in such
competitive times.l°°
In 1884, Congress added a provision to the Act apportioning
limitation among multiple owners of a ship and excluding seamen's claims
for wages from limitation.' 0 This amendment became the vehicle whereby
the Supreme Court determined that the Act applied to both maritime and
non-maritime torts. In Richardson v. Harmon, the Supreme Court held in

93.
In re Barracuda Tanker Corp. (The Torrey Canyon), 281 F. Supp. 228
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
94.
Id. at 229.
95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 229-30.
97.
Id.
98.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 820.
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
Act of June 26, 1884, ch. 121, 23 Stat. 53, (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 189
(2002)).
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dictum that the Act left a shipowner liable for his own "fault, neglect, and
contracts."'' 0 2 This paved the way for the development of the "personal
contract doctrine," by which shipowners remain liable for the contracts
they enter into. 0 3 Later, in The Soerstad, Judge Learned Hand held that a
shipowner may still secure limitation under the Act as long as the breach of
a personal contract is not personal to the owner.' 4 The distinction drawn
here demonstrates that private charters are personal in nature, while a
simple bill of lading is not. 0 5 The practical implication of this amendment
suggests that limitation opportunities by shipowners can be limited now
that restraints on carriers contracting with one another have been relaxed.'06
B.

LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF

1935

Belated action to rectify the injustices, which could occur under the
Act, and the only substantive amendments to the Act in its 150-year
history, were triggered by a marine disaster. 0 7 The burning of the
passenger cruise-liner Morrow Castle on September 8, 1934 sparked
Congressional as well as public concern over the meager limitation fund
that became available to the claimants after the tragedy. 08 In this
horrifying disaster, 134 lives were lost within sight of the coast of New
Jersey. 1 9 Afterward, when facing claims for the loss or injury to
passengers as well as to cargo, the shipowners of the Morrow Castle
successfully invoked the Act."10 Consequently, since so little was left of
the vessel, the salvage value and the corresponding limitation fund was
fixed to satisfy all claims at approximately $20,000."'
The response to amend these gross inequities of the Act came from
Congress in 1935. This amendment provided for extra protection in
personal injury and death claims on seagoing vessels." 2 In order to more
comprehensively satisfy legitimate claims, a shipowner was mandated by

102.
103.

Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96, 106 (1911).

Rae M. Crowe, Kinds of Losses Subject to Limitation: The "Personal Contract

Doctrine," 53 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1106 (1979).
104.
Greenman, supra note 85, at 284.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Alan F. Schoedel, Maritime Liability: Issues for the New Congress, 1 I MAR.
105, 106 (1986).
Id.
108.
109.
Greenman, supra note 85, at 284.
Id. See also Morro Castle (Settlement), 1939 A.M.C. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
110.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
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this amendment to provide a fund amounting to $60 per gross ton of the
vessel (now raised to $420 per ton)" 13 to be used to satisfy these claims,
regardless of the vessel's actual value." 14 This supplemental fund was to be
drawn upon only when the value of the ship, after the mishap, was
insufficient to cover the total amount of damages awarded. 15 The
disbursement of the fund was now also determined on a case-by-case basis,
rather than at the end of the voyage."16 Under this change, a sunk or
otherwise valueless vessel would no longer totally eliminate a shipowner's
liability.' 17
The new amendment also set a statute of limitations by which vessel
owners must now act in order to invoke the protections of the Act."H8 The
owner must petition the court within six months of receiving written notice
of a claim or be effectively barred from using the Act as a defense. 19 With
this amendment in place, the fortune de mer funds for those who have been
maimed or died have rightly been increased. However, those who suffer
property loss or damage have been left in the same disadvantaged position
they have occupied since the inception of the Act in 1851.120
Iv.
A.

MODERN TRENDS/CURRENT STATE OF THE ACT

MODERNIZATION OF THE ACT

The 1935 amendment took an adverse position toward the interests of
the vessel owner, reflecting a sharp decline in legislative enthusiasm
toward the Act.' 2' Furthermore, the amendment reflected the abrupt
changes taking place in the political climate during the Great Depression
and underscored the emphasis being placed on the "small man" at this point
in American history. 122 Subsidies had now become a more common
method of aiding favored industries, and seamen, not shipowners, were the

113.
Complaint of Dillahey, 1990 A.M.C. 1458 (D.N.J. 1990).
114.
Id. at 285.
115.
Id.
116.
Greenman, supra note 85, at 284. See also 46 U.S.C. app. § 183(d) (2002).
117.
Comment, Limitation of Liability in Admiralty: An Anachronismfrom the Days
of Privity, 10 VILL. L. REV. 721, 729 (1965).
118.
Id. See also 46 U.S.C. app. § 185 (2002) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
allowing an owner to seek exoneration as well as limitation).
119.
Comment, supra note 117, at 729.
120.
Id.
121.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 82 1.
122.
Comment, supra note 117, at 729.
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"favored darlings of the day."'' 23 Since the 1930s, both legislative and
24
judicial enthusiasm for the limitation principle has dramatically declined.
The Act stands today virtually unchanged from its form in 1935.125
However, the Act was recently amended in 1984 to increase the minimum
limitation fund available in cases of claims for loss of life and bodily injury
from $60 to $420 per ton. 126 Although a de minimus change, this increase
is a clear reflection of congressional concern over ensuring that
compensation is awarded to those who have suffered a loss. This change to
the limitation fund, however, does little to mitigate the potential harshness
of the law.
B.

UNDERSTANDING THE ACT AS A PROCEDURAL MECHANISM

Gaining a procedural understanding of the Act is necessary to fully
realize how the law operates under the vague explanations of the
proceedings by which the right is to be enforced. 27 Before employing the
protections of the Act, a shipowner is faced with meeting several
requirements. First, when a shipowner is faced with a claim, he must file a
petition for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability in a federal district
court sitting in admiralty jurisdiction. 28 The owner then has six months
from the time of receiving notice of a claim to file the petition, or,
alternatively, may plead limitation as a defense without regard to the sixmonth time limit. 29 Proper venue must then be realized in a district in
which the vessel has been attached or arrested, or in any district in which
the owner has been sued regarding the claim.' 30 When the vessel has not
been attached or arrested, and suit has not been initiated, venue is proper in
the district where the vessel is located or if the vessel cannot be located,
then venue is proper in any district.' 3' Additionally, the shipowner must

123.

124.
125.

Id.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3,at 82 1.
Complaint of Dillahey, 733 F. Supp 874, 877 (D.N.J. 1990).

126.
Id. at 877 n.2.
Schoenbaum, supra note 11, at 809. Schoenbaum, a noted author in the area of
127.
admiralty, wrote that the Act was "badly drafted even by the standards of the time" yet
continues in effect today. Id.
128.
Struble, supra note 75, at 978. See also Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Supp. Adm. Rule
F(l).
129.
Struble, supra note 75, at 978. See also Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Supp. Adm. Rule
F(l).
130.
Struble, supra note 75, at 978. See also Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Supp. Adm. Rule
F(9).
131.
Struble, supra note 75 at 978. See also Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Supp. Adm. Rule
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either surrender the ship to the court or deposit with the court an amount
equal to the owner's interest in the vessel and pending freight (or security
for that amount), in addition to paying any sums the court may deem
necessary. 132
When these requirements are met, the Act states that the shipowner
must then initiate a limitation action by petitioning the federal court to stay
proceedings elsewhere.' 3 3 "Thus, the limitation of liability proceeding may
itself be an action and not just a defense."' 134 The court will then establish a
concourse of claims or "concursus," which prevents potential litigants from
filing related claims in collateral jurisdictions, as well as consolidate all
current claimants into one federal forum.' 35 This is necessary when the
limitation fund is not adequate to satisfy all claims against the shipowner
and the court must divide the fund amongst all claimants pro rata. 36 In
addition to a judicial economy benefit, the "concursus" also minimizes
forum shopping by statutorily directing a claimant's choice of venue, as
well as averts jury trials in state courts. 137 More importantly, however, the
Act reserves jurisdiction exclusively for the federal courts, which have
been the traditional and favored forums of admiralty law. 138 Finally, for
purposes of determining whether the owner is actually entitled to a
limitation of liability under the Act, the initial burden of proving
39
negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness lies on the claimant.
However, once that burden is satisfied, the burden of proof shifts to the
shipowner to show there was an absence of privity or knowledge. 140

F(9).
Id.
132.
See 46 U.S.C. app. § 185 (2002).
133.
Stone, supra note 14, at 325.
134.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. S. Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207, 219 (1927)
135.
(stating that because the limitation proceeding is equitable by its very nature, the court may
modify the pro rata distribution as necessary).
Id.
136.
Id. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. F(9).
137.
138.
Jill A. Schaar, The Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act: Still Afloat or
Sinking Fast?,24 TUL MAR. L.J. 659, 661-62 (2000).
In re Complaint of Cirigliano, 708 F. Supp. 101, 103 (D.N.J. 1989).
139.
Id.
140.
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REASONS COURTS MAY STRIKE DOWN THE ACT

ORIGINAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS NO LONGER EXIST

The argument that the Act has served its time and should be repealed
has become commonplace in modem America. 141 Professors Gilmore and
Black, leading authorities in maritime law, have stated that in recent years
the limitation principle has been attacked by many and defended by almost
none. 142 Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of courts have repeatedly
voiced their frustrations with the Act, calling it "antiquated," "hopelessly
anachronistic," and "a relic of an earlier era."' 143 In fact, one commentator
was noted as saying, "[in seven ill-worded sections designed to conform to
English law, the Thirty-first Congress laid the foundations of the American
system of limitation that exists today."' 44 Consequently, the holdings in
limitation cases that have been decided since the mid-1950s have, with a
few exceptions, been adverse to the petitioning shipowner.145
Several major changes have taken place in the maritime world since
Congress initially passed the Act in 1851 that have furthered these negative
attitudes toward the law and have contributed to the Act becoming virtually
non-essential to the continued well-being of the American shipping
industry. First, the Act was passed in an era before the corporation had
become the standard form of business organization and before the present
forms of insurance protection that are now available to shipowners had
developed.' 46 To put it another way, as commercial relationships have
changed over time, enthusiasm for the statute has waned with the
widespread use of protection and indemnity insurance and the use of the
corporate form, which offers shipowners layers of liability protection
unknown in 1851.1 47 Furthermore, in environmental actions, federal

141.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 821. Proponents of the Act, however, state
that deference should be given to the legislature and the decision to repeal the Act should be
left to them and not the courts. Additionally, proponents suggest that the Act is still an
important ingredient of American admiralty law by enabling shipowners to compete more
effectively on a global level. Finally, some proponents argue that the amendments to the
Act have corrected the problems inherent in its original form and do not infringe upon the
rights of the individual. See generally, Donald C. Greenman, Maritime Casualtiesand the
Limitation of Liability Act, 32 J. MAR. L. & COM. 279 (2001).
142.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at 821.
143.
Esta Later Charters, Inc. v. Ignacio, 875 F.2d 234, 239 (9th Cir. 1989). See also
Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch v. United States, 557 F.2d 438,441 (5th Cir. 1977).
144.
Esta Later Charters,Inc., 557 F.2d at 236 (1989).
145.
Glacier Bay v. McGahan, 944 F.2d 577, 580 (9th Cir. 1991).
146.
Id.
147.
In re Complaint of Armatur, S.A., 710 F. Supp. 390, 397 (1990).
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environmental statutes now offer damage limits for shipowners in
environmental disasters, which are often the most costly claims, and
thereby eliminate any need to invoke the protections of the Act.148 Finally,
in addition to these changes, an enormous improvement in communications
technology has provided the modem shipowner with a degree of control
that was unimaginable in 1851.149 The "knowledge or privity" requirement
was, prior to this modem technology, a strong argument in favor of
allowing limitation of liability because shipowners lacked control of the
vessel once it left port.' 50 However, today this is no longer an issue.
Therefore, although "knowledge or privity" was once thought to enable
courts to tailor the Act to achieve equitable results, this phrase has now
become an "empty container
into which the courts are free to pour
5
whatever content they will."' '
It is also well known that by the mid-twentieth century, courts and
scholars alike were expressing serious reservations toward the Act. 152 A
quote in 1954 from Justice Black, speaking on behalf of four members of
the Court in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, has often been quoted in
support of these reservations:
Judicial expansion of the Limited Liability Act at this date
seems especially inappropriate. Many of the conditions of
the shipping industry that induced the 1851 Congress to
pass the act no longer prevail. And later Congresses, when
they wished to aid shipping, provided subsidies paid out of
the public treasury, rather than subsidies paid by injured
persons. 153
Virtually all of the subsequent criticisms of the Act since Maryland
Casualty Co. have been some form of Justice Black's basic assertion that

148. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988); Oil
Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (West Supp. 1990). See also, Mark E. King, In Re
Complaint of Armatur, S.A.: The Limitation of Liability Act and Maritime Environmental
Disasters, 21 ENVTL. L. 405, 422 (1991). Prior to the passage of federal environmental
statutes, shipowners were allowed to invoke the protections of the Act when their actions
caused environmental damage. Id.
149.
King, supra note 148, at 422.
150. Id.
151.
GILMORE& BLACK, supra note 3, at 877.
152.
Greenman, supra note 85, at 285.
153.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1954).
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the Act has not kept up with the changing conditions in maritime law. 154
Subsequent judicial actions have, therefore, shown staunch opposition to
liability limitation in the vast majority of cases and have expressly
showcased the court's disfavor toward the Act. 155 Furthermore, a number
of courts hearing limitation cases have clearly stated that legislative action
is necessary to right the wrongs created by the Act of 1851 .156
The case of Norwich Co. v. Wright, in 1871, was the first major
decision to criticize the Act as being "imperfect," "fragmentary," and "so
ambiguous as to be unworkable."'' 57 Later cases have conveyed very
similar messages. For instance, the case of In re United States Dredging
Corp. stated that the Act provides shipowners a "generous measure of
protection not available to any other enterprise in our society," and that the
Act is a relic of an earlier era providing protections that are "neither
warranted nor consistent with current reality."' 158 The justices in In re
Petition of The Dodge, Inc. stated that ambiguous language in statutory
provisions relating to limitation of liability should be resolved in favor of
interpretations increasing the instances where full recoveries from the
limiting vessel are possible. 159 Again in In re Hercules Carriers,Inc. v.
Florida, the court expressed some serious reservations about the Act when
it stated, "the Limitation of Liability Act is an antiquated statute. It is time
for Congress to take the wheel and re-examine the policies which led to the
legislation.' 16 0 Finally, in University of Texas Medical Branch v. United
States, the court stated that the Act is "an ancient vessel plying
the seas"
' 61
and went on to describe the Act as "hopelessly anachronistic."'
The culmination of this trend has sparked a series of district court
cases holding that the protections of the Act are decidedly more than

154.
Greenman, supra note 85, at 285.
155.
Id.
156.
Id. See also Maryland Casualty Co., 347 U.S. at 409.
157.
Esta Later Charters, Inc. v. Ignacio, 875 F.2d 234, 236 (1989) (construing
Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871)). Gilmore & Black were also quoted
in Esta Later Charters as saying, "[T]he Liability Act seems oddly out of place in the
modem economy; its application could well lead to wholly unexpected and harsh results.
We see no plausible reason for adopting an interpretation of the Act that will exacerbate
these consequences." Id.
158.
In re United States Dredging Corp., 264 F.2d 339, 341 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 932 (1959). Judge Hand is quoted as saying, "It is at least doubtful
whether the motives that originally lay behind the limitation are not now obsolete." Id. at
341.
159.
282 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1960).
160.
728 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
161.
557 F.2d 438. 441 (5th Cir. 1977).
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"hopelessly anachronistic."' 162 These cases have gone beyond merely
stating their disfavor for the law by explicitly castigating the current use of
the Act. 163 One court stated that "[t]o allow [the plaintiff] to take
advantage of this Act would result in a gross miscarriage of justice ... and

this court cannot ignore the fundamental unfairness of the law as it
exists. ' 64 This court was also noted as saying that to limit liability in a
case such as this would be "as outrageous as allowing an automobile owner
to limit his liability to the value of his car should he crash while out on a
Sunday drive."1 65 Finally, all of these courts, in some form or another,
have stated that the societal changes that have taken place since the
inception of the law now dictate congressional re-evaluation of the
statute.1 66 Therefore, as Gilmore and Black have stated in their works, "it
is quite fair to say that the Limitation of167 Liability Act is not the most
acclaimed statute ever put into the books."'
68
Esta Later Charters1
is a common example of a limitation case
illustrating the harshness of the Act and justifies the concerns judges have
had toward applying its principles over the last 150 years. In this case, the
Kadena de Amor was badly damaged in an explosion causing severe
injuries to the victims. 169 One claimant lost a son, while another suffered
70
burns over ninety percent of his body, a broken arm and a fractured skull. 1
At the time the demand was made, the burn victim had incurred over
7
$250,000 in expenses for intensive care, surgery and skin grafts.' '
Additionally, this victim would be forced to contemplate the future costs of
ongoing treatment, surgery, and rehabilitation. 172 Esta Later, however,

162.
See, e.g., In re Palmer Johnson Savannah, Inc., I F. Supp. 2d 1377 (S.D. Ga.
1997); Luhr Bros., Inc. v. Gagnard, 765 F. Supp. 1264 (W.D. La. 1991); In re Lowing, 635
F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Mich. 1986); Complaint of Tracey, 608 F. Supp. 263 (D. Mass. 1985);
Baldassano v. Larsen, 580 F. Supp. 415 (D. Minn. 1984).
163.
See PalmerJohnson, I F. Supp. 2d at 1385; Luhr Bros., Inc., 765 F. Supp. at
1268; Complaint of Tracey, 608 F. Supp. at 268; Lowing, 635 F. Supp at 528; Baldassano,
580 F. Supp at 418.
164.
Baldassano, 580 F. Supp. at 416. A corporate owner of a pontoon boat was
involved in a collision with a speedboat. The owner then sought to limit liability under the
Act, but the court held that the Act did not apply to collision between two pleasure boats.
Petition for limitation was therefore denied. Id.
165.
Id.
166.
In re Petition of The Dodge, Inc., 282 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1960).
167.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, §§ 10-2, 10-4(a).
168.
875 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1989).
169.
Id. at 238.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
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claimed that it was entitled to limit its liability to the value of the vessel,
which was set at $3,000.173 The court stated that this was an "absurdly
174
small amount compared to the damages suffered by the claimants."
However, the court also stated that although they are bound to follow the
statute if it is clearly within the purport of the law, when there is any room
for interpretation, it is appropriate to consider the effects on the parties and
choose an interpretation that "avoids a patently unjust result."175 The court
then went on to deny the request for limitation, implying that the Act
should be very narrowly construed in its application, thereby rendering the
Act almost useless to shipowners in all but the most narrow of
circumstances. 176
The Act, however, even in its present form, instills some measure of
security in the corporate shipowner, and thereby dissipates the incentive to
provide a safer marine environment.177 This harmful economic side effect
is especially notable when extremely high clean-up costs occur in
environmental disasters. 178 Normally, from an economic standpoint, the
potentially ruinous costs to a corporation that could occur from the clean up
of an environmental disaster would be expected to promote high avoidance
costs. 17 9
However, when liability is limited, as it could be in an
environmental disaster, the corporation is less likely to engage in the
optimal efforts to prevent such disasters.18 Thus, the Act is working to the
detriment of efficient economics by shifting the cost of damages away from
the shipowner and re-directing the burden of absorbing these costs onto the
injured parties.'81 Therefore, "[i]n light of modem
environmental concerns,
82
good."
than
harm
more
does
Act
the Liability
There can be no doubt that the Act once had legitimate purposes and
effectuated a noble end. 83 Saving the American shipping industry from
financial ruin, and helping it to compete globally during the height of the
Industrial Revolution, was crucial to the development of the United States'

173.
875 F.2d 234, 238 (9th Cir. 1989). The dollar amount was determined by the
highest bid for the vessel at the United States Marshal's sale. Id.
174.
Id.
175.
Id. at 239.
176.
Id.
177.
See generally King, supra note 148, at 423.
178.
Id. A number of disastrous vessel oil spills have occurred to demonstrate the
destruction that these accidents wreak on the environment and the expense in limiting and
repairing the damage.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.
181.
Id.
182.
Id.
183.
Harolds, supra note 54, at 426.
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economy in very uncertain times.' 84 However, the many changes that have
taken place over the last 150 years, including the widespread use of the
corporate form and the many types of insurance that are now available to
shipowners, have completely eroded the legitimate purposes once
supporting the Act.' 85 The courts are in almost universal agreement with
this fact and should now consider bearing the burden of striking down a
law that is 86not simply tenuous, but one that is completely void of
foundation.1
B.

THE COURT'S DUTY TO STRIKE DOWN LAWS WITHOUT FOUNDATION

Legislation that no longer possesses a legitimate end is often
repugnant to the Constitution and requires legislative action to either
legitimate or repeal the law.' 87 However, when the legislature is stagnant
in its duties, as it has been toward the Act, the courts must intervene to
determine the constitutionality of the law in question. 188 Moore v. Mobile
stated that, "if it clearly appears that [an] act of [the] legislature
unreasonably invades rights guaranteed by the Constitution, [the Supreme
Court] not only ha[s] [the] power but [the] duty to strike it down."' 8 9
This unique power, known as "judicial review," is not mentioned in
the U.S. or state constitutions, but over time has become accepted as a
legitimate judicial power. 90 The concept was first explained in Marbury v.
Madison where it was determined that judges may declare invalid and set
aside laws passed by the legislatures or executive acts that the courts
interpret as violating the Constitution. 19 It was specifically stated that, "a
law repugnant to the [c]onstitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
192
departments, are bound by that instrument."'
So if a law be in opposition to the [C]onstitution; if both
the law and the [C]onstitution apply to a particular case, so

184.

See generally GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3.

187.

See generally, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).

189.

592 So. 2d 156, 159 (Ala. 1991) (emphasis added).

The American shipping

industry was facing financial ruin as a result of an increasingly litigious environment, thus
making it very difficult to compete with the stronger European nations on a global level. Id.
185.
Glacier Bay v. McGahan, 944 F.2d 577, 580 (9th Cir. 1991).
186.
In re Petition of The Dodge, Inc., 282 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1960).
188.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

190.
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF
sources of the Supreme Court's authority).
191.

192.

RIGHTS,

1-30 (1958) (setting forth the nature and

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

Id. at 180.
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that the court must either decide that case conformably to
the law, disregarding the [C]onstitution; or conformably to
the [C]onstitution, disregarding the law; . . . the
[law], must govern
[C]onstitution, and not such ordinary
93
1
apply.
both
they
which
to
the case
A statute, such as the Act, that alters the rules of liability and
supplants the common-law compensatory mechanism may face a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge. 94 Although deference is usually given
to the legislature when an equal protection or a due process violation is
asserted, when a law no longer achieves a legitimate end and is devoid of
foundation, the courts must exercise their duty to determine the
constitutionality of the law. 195 Therefore, as the Act now rests on a
foundation that is no longer legitimate in our modem American196 shipping
industry, the courts must address the constitutionality of the Act.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE 1851 LIMITATION ACT
A.

EQUAL PROTECTION/DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS

Given its radical departure from the common law rules of liability, the
Act of 1851 is subject to question under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment on a number of grounds. 97 First, however, courts
must determine which standard of review is applicable to the statute. To do
this and determine whether a statute violates the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection, the court will first see if the legislation creates an
inherently suspect classification, such as race, ethnicity, or national origin,
or affects a fundamental right guaranteed and protected by our
Constitution. 98 If a suspect classification is then determined to exist, the

Id. at 178.
193.
Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors:Using Nuisance Law to
194.
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See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). The modem trend
195.
in constitutional law has been to follow the McCulloch means-end test in determining the
constitutionality of a law. Necessitating legitimate means as well as a legitimate end has
given the courts more power to strike down laws no longer resting on a solid foundation.
Therefore the deference once given to the legislature and the laws they created is no longer
uncontested as the review power of the courts has been given more "bite." Heller v. Doe
509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993).
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court will impose the strict scrutiny test. 199 Under this test the burden of
proof shifts to the government to prove that the law is narrowly tailored and
furthers a compelling governmental interest. 2° Other classifications that
are suspect, but not requiring strict scrutiny, such as gender or mental
capacity, are subject to the intermediate level of scrutiny, and require a
substantial relationship between the statute and an important governmental
interest in the law. 20 1 However, social or economic legislation is generally
examined under the rational basis test.20 2
Under the rational basis test, legislation is constitutional if it is merely
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. 3 The statute is
presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging it bears a heavy
burden of rebutting that presumption. 204 The party challenging the
legislation must show that the legislation is arbitrary and wholly unrelated
in a rational way to the objective of the statute.20 5 Therefore, a
classification is valid if the legislative judgment is supported by any set of
facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed.20 6 The wisdom,
need, or appropriateness of the legislation is not pertinent, nor does the
classification need to have been made with pinpoint accuracy.20 7
An equal protection analysis of the Act will begin by noting that
because the legislation involved neither a suspect classification nor a
fundamental right, the rational basis standard of review should be applied.
Under this standard, a court must determine whether the legislative purpose
for implementing the limitation on recovery outweighs the tort litigant's
right to redress.20 8 In regard to the Act, however, the rational basis test
cannot even be applied. There is no longer an existing legislative purpose
on which to base an analysis. The foundation or purposes of the Act have
long ceased to exist, as noted previously. 2°9 Therefore, the statute cannot
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have a legitimate purpose and is therefore unconstitutional. However, even
if a court were to find some fragment of a legitimate governmental interest,
the Act would still likely fail under a full rational basis review. 210
Under a full rational basis review, the Act would still likely violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 1 Under this equal
protection analysis, "an injured party's right to recover is an important
substantive right, such that any legislative classification impinging on that
right must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having fair and substantial relation to [the] object of
legislation. 2t 2 Aside from the fact that the object of the legislation no
longer exists, the damages cap from the Act discriminates between the
class of people whose injuries deserve more compensation than the cap
allows (and therefore who cannot fully recover) and the class whose
relatively minor injuries do not warrant damages at a level constrained by
the cap.213 The cap on damage recovery also distinguishes between
maritime victims and victims of other torts and does nothing to provide
adequate compensation to claimants with meritorious claims.2 14 On the
contrary, it does just the opposite for the most seriously injured claimants
and does nothing to eliminate non-meritorious claims.2 15
Regardless of whether or not a court acknowledges there is no longer
a valid justification for the continuance of the Act (as its foundation has
disintegrated), the conclusion of the court ought to determine that the Act
unreasonably discriminates in favor of shipowners and unduly burdens
seriously injured maritime claimants. 216 The loss in excess of the limited
value is violative of equal protection, creating an arbitrary damage
limitation and thereby precluding only the most seriously injured victims 2of17
shipowner negligence from receiving full compensation for their injuries.
Finally, not only is there the possibility of a windfall benefit to the
defendant's insurer, but a statute which singles out seriously injured
maritime victims whose damages exceed the value of the limited shipowner
liability will force one class of victim to shoulder the entire financial
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burden inherent to such a scheme and will offend the basic notions of
fairness and justice.21 8
In addition to claiming an equal protection violation, claimants may
assert a due process violation, which contends that the elimination of a
common law right, such as the right to recover full damages on a tort
action, deprives a person of property.2 19 Under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, no person may be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. 220 Therefore, the Act violates due
process because it allows the destruction of property or loss of life without
reasonable certainty that the victims will be justly compensated or receive a
quid pro quo. 22 1 Claimants may contend that the legislature, by allowing
the Act to remain, has reduced, or in some cases eliminated, the claimants'
ability to recover full damages. In such cases the government has
putatively taken an asset from the claimant.222 Thus the claimant may be
successful in asserting that the government has arbitrarily taken property
from them and has thereby violated due process.223 It must also be
remembered that in cases involving damages incapable of precise
measurement, like many maritime claims, an injured party has a
constitutionally protected right to receive an amount of damages fixed by a
jury unless the verdict is "so flawed by bias, passion, prejudice,
corruption,
' 224
or improper motive as to lose its constitutional protection."
B.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE ACT

As the Act would not likely survive judicial scrutiny due to its
arbitrary and unreasonable application, many concerns arise amongst
scholars as to how maritime cases would thus be handled in its absence.22 5
Today it is clear that better, more sophisticated alternatives for shipowners
exist.226 In lieu of utilizing the protections of the Act, a shipowner may
employ contract protections, charter options, mortgage uses, the separate
incorporation of vessels, or bankruptcy.22 7 Additionally, to compensate for
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the loss of the "concourse of creditors" benefit within the Act, the courts
may implement the use of interpleader to otherwise effectively provide for
a concourse of claims. 228 Interpleader allows a party to bring together in
one proceeding, all parties, known or unknown, who may have a claim to a
particular fund, and requires those parties to litigate their claims for this
fund amongst themselves. 229 Furthermore, modem federal environmental
protection statutes already effectively preempt the Act in environmental
disaster cases, thus eliminating the need for the Act in all such
circumstances.23 °
C.
ANALOGOUS SITUATIONS IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT

The idea of limiting liability is by no means unique to admiralty
In fact, the Warsaw Convention has limited the liability of
international air carriers, while the Price-Anderson Act has prescribed
limits on liability for nuclear power plant operators in the United States,232
in addition to the many medical malpractice limitations that have been
implemented in the vast majority of the states. The courts, however, have
seen fit to strike down a number of these limits on liability, claiming they
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 33 The courts interpreting the Act
should, therefore, take note of these decisions and find that the arbitrarily
imposed limits set by the Act should not be upheld.
Many of the judges reviewing medical malpractice limitation statutes,
like those who oppose the Act, have noted that low limitations are not
constitutional.23 4 The case of Arneson v. Olson reviewed a medical
malpractice limitation, setting the maximum figure at $300,000 per
law.23 1
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occurrence, and noted that "no state court of last resort has upheld a low
limitation" such as this.235 Illinois courts, for example, have held that a
$500,000 limitation was unconstitutional as arbitrary,23 6 as did Idaho for
$150,000 per claim and $300,000 per occurrence.237

Unfortunately, the

limitation figures of the Act are much more arbitrary than these examples
and are likely to yield an even lower limitation fund as well as be even
more detrimental to the claimants when a concursus of claims arises.
The arguments made in the medical malpractice cases that have struck
down statutes limiting liability are the same as those made by those who
call for the repeal of the Act.23 8 These malpractice cases state that
limitation violates equal protection because it provides for what Congress
has deemed to be a benefit to society but places the entire cost of that
239
benefit on an arbitrarily chosen segment of society (the injured victims).
The statutes, therefore, create a favored class of tortfeasors, based solely on
their connection with the health care industry (or the shipping industry), by
shielding those health care providers (or shipowners) whose actions are the
most egregious.24a In other words, the burden imposed falls most heavily
on those who are the most severely maltreated and thus most deserving of
relief, while the statutes operate to the advantage of those health care
providers (or shipowners) who were the most irresponsible. 241 Thus it is
unfair to impose the burden of supporting the medical care industry (or
shipping industry) solely upon those persons most severely injured and
most in need of compensation. 242
In reality, many of the limitation statutes that are upheld are simply
not challenged or reviewed constitutionally.24 3 This is often due to
enormous pressure from the insurance industry, the American Medical
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Association, or large corporate shipowners. 2 " Sadly then, claimants are
often forced to accept compensation that is but a fraction of that deserved,
and the courts are unable to conclude that a limitation on the amount of
damages plaintiffs may recover unreasonably infringes on their
constitutionally guaranteed right
to obtain full redress for injuries caused
245
by another's wrongful conduct.

VII. CONCLUSION

While mere economics may have provided the justification for the
original enactment of the 1851 Shipowner Limitation of Liability Act, the
Act today is well past its prime. It is a sad remnant of another era, and a
very different American economy. The Act blossomed at a time when
insurance was unknown, corporate ownership was non-existent, and vessel
owners knew nothing about their investments for months at a time. As
these concerns are no longer valid justifications to support the ancient
doctrine, the Act now does little more than offend the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as the basic notions of fairness and justice. And as one
court noted, "[wie must not lose our contemporary compass. The shifting
sands of time demand innovative interpretative analysis lest we come to
rest on a shoal that did not threaten our grandfathers, but is only newly
The Limitation Act served its purpose once, but protections
formed.'
available to the modern shipping industry are far greater today, thus
eliminating any reason for allowing the Act to remain part of American
admiralty law at the expense of innocent victims. It is time for the courts to
strike it down.
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